United States Fire Insurance Company v. Samuel R. Fleenor and Mary M. Fleenor by unknown
I , 
I 11 9 '2 
Record No. 2485 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
UNITED ST A TES FIRE INSURANCE COMP ANY 
vs. 
SAMUEL R. FLEENOR and MARY M. FLEENOR 
From the Corporation Court of the City of Bristol, Va. 
----.o- ---
RULE 14 
«j 5. NUMBER OF COPIES To BE FILED AND DELIVERED 
To OPPOSING COUNSEL. Twenty copies of each brief shall be 
filed with the clerk of the court, and at least two copies mailed 
or delivered to opposing counsel on or before the day on which 
the brief is filed. 
CJ 6. SrzE AND TYPE. Briefs shall be printed in type not 
less in the size than small pica, and shall be nine inches in length 
and six inches in width, so as to conform in dimension to the 
printed records. The record number of the case shall be print-
ed on all briefs. 
The foregoing is printed in small pica type for the informa-
tion of counsel. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk 
Court opens at 9: 3 o a. m.; Adjourns at r : oo p. m. 
Camelot Publishing Company, Wytheville, Va. 

--:,, . 
• I ,, 
Additional c1t.a\1c na ror. AJ)P!ll•a\ 
Pet. 1 R. g~ add B & O R °'~'. VB Kepner,, 81 L 'Ed Adv Shta 31, ·40, and ca. cl. in ,U1ffenttng op., p 42. . 
Pe-t., R. 11. f'.oll .. owtng· Flz. CQe• add so. Ry. va Fa1nterf; 
as t Ed Adv Shte· 123. -&Tennessee Cbancellor 111,otned 
further prosecution o.f a.c.tlon 1n a Mias. :feder.a1 court. 
at ~nstance ar a Virginia corporation. · 
NY &c R Co V8- Matzinger (Obio.), 25 U ·2J:ld ~49 •. P~1.tt, 
a oorpora.t1on of a s.tate other· than~ Ohlo# injoinad an 
Ohio res1dent tr'Qm prQaecut1ng a au1t 1.u.· lll .. · ~val Ying 
an Ohio in.jury.. Oas& cited .in 86 L Ed ·Adv Sb.ta;I ,n,,, 
' 
Pet..,. R. 13· atter line· .3,· add Pink cue., 86 L Ed .AdV Shta 
· .. · at aoS; ~The 1.nterpre.ta'tion aad 1egal effect ot· po11c1es 
· ~:r 1nstP:'ance entered into by the·-1nbab1tanta. of. oa.# 
who· are sued upon them ~n ·-t~s eourta, .are ~1«rlr. · 
matters o:£ loca1 concern." ~ · ... -.. ··· 
P~ 6. Patton caee reported 1n 119 Tenn. 364-•. 
=-· -~··:·•··-
=P .• 14. Thornd.:t..ke case decided -1n 18~ . and the earlier · 
ea.sea · cited in note 1n 21 ;tRA ~l . AN1 seneml7 
s·peak1ng* not in ac·cord with later authwltl,e.a. 
P.15. Relier was ·granted in 0 1·ua1.re oaa.e. also .r-$po~ed 
in 152 ASR .191. T'he note,· even thin; re:cites· changes 
in earlier law. ~~: .. -~ 
P.20·,· bottom. See R. 28-.9., .all.eging policy 1• a: ;B. Y. 
standard J:orm,. required 'b7 V•• .statute t~ be ~;: 
·also R. 45• amen•n~- to- bU1, all~gtng v1·ola.~;01?.. ot 
foreclosure . prov1•D5ii, and g1v1llg rac:t:a · and 48.tea.. 
~ •. 21, ~oll-ow1ng CJ. citation• ad~ 29 Am. Jur.,, -~~ Sec. -
841 and cases cited. 
INDEX TO PETITION 
Side Page 
Statement of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 * 
The Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 * 
Assignment of Error 
The trial court should have injoined dtfendants from 
the further prosecution of their suit in Tennes~ee, so 
far as it relates to complainant, and should not have 
dismissed its bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 * 
The Law.................................... 4* 
Specific reasons for injunctive relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 * 
1. Action on the policy barred in Virginia . . . . . . 1 5 * 
2. The amount of recovery differs in the two states 16 * 
3. Notice of foreclosure as a defense in the two states 1 8 * 
4. Estoppel against defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 * 
5. Fraud and false swearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20* 
6. "Occupied as a dwelling" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 * 
7. Examination of insured . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 * 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 * 
TABLE OF CITATIONS 
American Express Co. vs. Fox, 135 Tenn. 489, 187 S. 
W.1117, Ann. Cas.1918B1148 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11* 
American Jurisprudence, Vol. 28, Injunctions, sections 
204-5 4* 
208 I I* 
212 5* 
American Jurisprudence, Vol. 29, Insurance section 6 5 6 1 9 * 
690 21* 
1127 23* 
I 134 18,20* 
I 188 18* 
Boyd vs. Vanderbilt Ins. Co., 90 Trnn. 212, 16 S. W. 
470, 25 ASR 676 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21* 
Bradford Elec. Light Co. vs. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 76 
L Ed. 1026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9* 
Cole vs. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 33 L. Ed. 538, 82 
ALR 666 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8* 
Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (2nd Ed.) 2073 . . . . . . . . 22* 
Dossett vs. First National Fire Ins. Co., 13 8 Tenn. 55 1, 
558, 198 s. w. 889 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 * 
Globe and Rutgers F. Ins. Co. vs. Stallard (CCA, 4), 68 
Fed. (2nd) 237 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20* 
Home Insurance Co. vs. Berry, 175 Va. 447, 9 S. E. 
(2nd) 290 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 8* 
Insurance Co. vs. Estes, 106 Tenn. 472, 477, 62 S. W. 
149, 52 LRA 915, 82 ASR 892 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19* 
Lavenstien vs. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 125 Va. 191, 220 20* 
Lewis vs. Western Assur. Co., 175 Tenn. 37, 130 S. W. 
(2nd) 982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 7* 
Lile' s Equity Jurisprudence, page 246 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 * 
North British, etc. Co. vs. Nidiffer, 1 1 2 Va. 5 9 1, Ann. 
Cas. 1 9 1 6 A 4 6 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 * 
Note, 69 ALR 591 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6* 
Oates vs. Morningside College (Iowa), 252 N. W. 783, 
91 ALR 563 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6* 
Richards on Insurance (4th Ed.), section 94 . . . . . . . . . 22* 
St. Paul etc. Co. vs. Kirkpatrick, 129 Tenn. 55, 73, 164 
S. W. I 186 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18* 
Va. Fire & Marine Ins. Co. vs. Hogue, 105 Va. 355 . . . . 20* 
Va. Fire & Marine Ins. Co. vs. Vaughan, 88 Va. 832; 
2nd Appeal, 102 Va. 541 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20* 
STATUTES 
Tennessee Code (Williams) , section 6 1 2 6 . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 * 
6172-74........... 17* 
6434 . . . . . . . . . . 18* 
Virginia Code, section 4220 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 * 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
Record No. 2485 
UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY 
vs. 
SAMUEL R. FLEENOR and MARY M. FLEENOR 
----10,----
PETITION 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia: 
Petitioner, complainant in the trial court, respectfully rep-
resents that it is aggrieved by a final decree entered therein by 
the Corporation Court of the City of Bristol on May 20, 1941, 
which denied the injunction prayed for in the bill and amended 
bill and dismissed the suit. The parties will ·be designated herein 
as complainant and defendants, as in the court below. From a 
transcript of the record attached hereto the following will ap-
pear: 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Complainant filed its bill against defendants, residents and 
citizens of Bristol, Virginia, praying an injunction against them 
from the further prosecution of a suit brought by them against 
it in the Chancery Court of Bristol, Tennessee, in which the face 
amount of its policy of fire insurance in the sum of $2,000.00 
on a building located in Bristol, Virginia, was sought to be 
2 * recovered, less $600.00 paid by complainant to *the bene-
ficiary under a deed of trust, to which was attached a stan-
dard form of mortgage clause in favor of the trustee in said deed 
of trust. 
Notice was served on defendants that a temporary injunc-
tion would be applied for, accompanied by one copy of the bill, 
and a new section was added to the bill by way of amendment, 
which is set out in the final decree. Defendants appeared, not in 
opposition to granting a temporary injunction, but moved the 
court to dismiss the bill on the ground that it failed to state a 
case justifying the issuance of an injunction, so that the court 
was in position to, and did treat the suit as heard on its merits. 
Upon a hearing it denied the injunction and dismissed the bill. 
THE FACTS 
The facts, are, therefore, alleged in the bill, and were prop-
erly treated by the trial court as undisputed, and a detailed state-
ment of facts here would amount only to a repetition of the al-
legation of the bill. Accordingly, the bill is relied upon for such 
statement of facts. 
However, for an immediate understanding of the question 
involved, certain of the facts will be repeated here, as follows: 
Complainant is a New York fire insurance corporation. 
domesticated and doing business both in Virginia and Tennessee. 
Its policy of fire insurance here involved covered a building 
jointly owned by defendants located in the City of Bristol, Vir-
ginia, the policy having been issued by a licensed Virginia agent 
and countersigned by him as such. At the time it was 
3 * *issued and ever since, defendants were actual residents of 
and domiciled in the State of Virginia, and S. R. Fleenor 
is in the employ of the State, his work being confined to the 
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boundaries thereof. He sued the trustee in the deed of trust for 
an accounting, and joined complainant therein; in the Chancery 
Court of Bristol, Tennessee, the sole relief against it being the 
recovery of the full amount of its policy, less the $600.00 here-
in before referred to, for loss by fire of the building insured. In 
Tennessee its chancery courts have concurrent jurisdiction with 
its law courts in suits for recovery under insurance policies. 
The power of the courts of this State to enjoin its citizens 
from prosecuting a suit in another state has not been questioned. 
There is involved only whether, under the allegations of the 
bill, this is a proper case for the exercise of such power. 
*ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
The trial court should have injoined defendants from the 
fut'ther prosecution of their suit in Tennessee, so faras it relates 
to complainant, and should not have dismissed its bill. 
THE LAW 
No Virginia decis:on has been found on the subject, but the 
general rule is thus stated in 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions, section 
204: 
"It is in fact the settled rule, supported by all the au-
thorities, that a court of equity in one state may and, in a 
proper case, w JI restrain its own citizens, or other persons 
w:thin the control of its process, from prosecuting actions or 
proceeding~ in ether states or in foreign countries. Such 
an injunction will be granted in favor of one who shows 
clearly that it would be inequitable to permit the prosecu-
tion of the suit. * * * Where a court of one country has 
jur'.sdiction of the parties, it may enjoin proceedings by 
them in another country or between different provinces of 
the same country. If the case stated by the complainant is 
such as to authorize the court to restrain a party from in-
stituting or carrying on proceedings in the forum, the court 
will in like manner enjoin him from prosecuting a suit in a 
foreign court. Such an injunction is not a violation of the 
. comity existing between states, nor is it in contravention of 
the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. 
In such cases, the decree of the court is directed to the party 
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and not the tribunal where the suit or proceeding is pend-
ing.'' 
Section 205: "The power of a court of equity to re-
strain actions in another state or country rests on the au-
thority vested in them over persons within the limits of 
their jurisdiction to enjoin them from doing inequitable 
acts to the wrong and injury of others, and on the power 
of the state to compel its own citizens to respect its laws, 
even beyond its own territorial limits. The court proceeds 
on the theory that as long as a citizen belongs to a state, he 
owes it obedience; and that as between states, the state in 
5 * which he is domiciled has jurisdiction over his person, * and 
his personal relations to other citizens of the state. Its act 
is an exercise of its power to require the defendant to do, or 
to refrain from doing, anything beyond the limits of its 
territorial jurisdiction which it might require to be done or 
omitted within the limits of such territory. There is no 
attempt to render the foreign tribunal subject to the con-
trol or direction of the local court or in any way to exer-
cise a supervisory power over it. There is a clear distinc-
tion between an injunction against the proceedings of a 
court in another state, and the power and authority of such 
court, and one to restrain the personal action of a citizen. 
In the first case the court has no jurisdiction, while in the 
other it proceeds in personam against the defendant, direct-
ing him to proceed no further in the action, without regard 
to the fact that the res of the controversy may be outside of 
the territorial jurisdiction of the court, for in such a case 
the court has the power to compel a party to do all the 
things necessary according to the lex loci rei sitae which he 
could do voluntarily to give full effect to the decree against 
him." 
One of the most common grounds for the relief is where 
the foreign suit by a resident of another state is for the purpose, 
or will have the effect of, evading the local laws of his domicil. 
On that point, which is here involved, section 21 2 of the same 
authority says: 
"As a general rule, a court of equity will, in order to 
prevent a result which is deemed unconscientious, restrain 
a resident of the state from bringing or prosecuting a suit in 
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a court of another state or country, in reference to a matter 
properly governed by the law of his residence, when it is 
made to appear that the applicable substantive law of such 
other state or country is materially different from the law 
of the forum and that because of the refusal of the foreign 
court to apply the substantive law conceived by the courts 
of the forum as properly governing the matter, a decision 
in variance with that law will result." 
Illustrative cases in which the relief will be granted, are 
stated in the same section to be where the party seeks to secure 
damages, which the state of domicil would deny him, .or to 
avoid some other matter of defense available in the forum 
* 6 *but not in the fore:gn jurisdiction, such as the statute of 
limitations, and if ''the complainant would be deprived 
of a defense recognized as valid in his state, his right to injunc-
tion is not affected by the fact that other defenses would be 
available to him in the foreign jurisdiction." 
The rule is thus stated in a note found in 69 ALR 59 I: 
"When, however, one resident of a state sues or threat-
ens to sue another, in the courts of some other state or coun-
try, in reference to a matter p~operly governed by the law 
of his residence, the courts of the latter state will, at the in-
stance of the defendant in the foreign suit, enjoin the pro-
ceeding, if it clearly appears that otherwise, because of the 
refusal of the foreign court to apply the substantive law 
conceived as prop~rly governing the matter, a decision at 
variance with that law may r-esult. And if it clearly ap-
pears that, because of the failure of the foreign court to ap-
ply the law of the state of the residence of the parties, con-
ceived as properly governing the case, the complainant 
would be deprived of a good defense, an injunction is held 
to be justified even though the foreign court might, upon 
other grounds, reach a proper result." 
Oates vs. Morningsside College (Iowa), 252 N. W. 783, 
o 1 ALR 563, was a suit in equity brought by the executor of 
Trimble, late a resident of Iowa, against an Iowa corporation to 
restrain it from prosecuting a claim against the ancillary admin-
istrator of the decedent's estate in South Dokota. Trimble had in 
his lifetime given the college a note secured by mortgage on real 
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estate in Iowa, on which foreclosure proceedings were instituted 
after Trimble's death. A demurrer was sustained to the claim 
for deficiency judgment on the note, on the ground that no claim 
had been filed with the executor within the twelve months period 
after his appointment allowed by Iowa law. Ancillary adminis-
tration was necessary in South Dakota in order to carry out the 
terms of Trimble's will, and the college therein filed its 
7* claim for deficiency after foreclosure. *This proceeding 
was enjoined by ,the Iowa court. 
The opinion quotes the following from an Illinois case: 
"The state has power to compel its own citizens to res-
pect its laws even beyond its own territorial limits, and the 
power of the courts, is undoubted to restrain one citizen 
from prosE.cuting in the courts of a foreign state an action 
against another which will result in a fraud or gross wrong 
or oppression.'' 
It also quotes the following from 3 2 C. J. 1 1 5 : 
''However, all that is necessary to sustain the jurisdic-
tion in such cases is that plaintiff show a clear equity and 
that defendant should be subject to the authority and with-
in the reach of the process of the court, and this require-
ment is satisfied where it is shown that the institution of the 
suit in another state was for the purpose of securing to 
plaintiff some unfair, unconscionable or inequitable ad-
vantage, or is collusive, or that the prosecution thereof will 
1t in fraud, gross wrong or oppression or in irreparable 
ury ... or that the suit is against the public policy of 
the state in whose courts the injunction is sought." 
j One of the two grounds stated by the court for granting the 
injunction was that the claim of the college was barred in Iowa 
(page 567, col. 2). As to this the court says: 
"It is also a well-settled rule of law that a citizen of 
one state will be enjoined by the courts of his state from 
prosecuting an action against another citizen of the same 
state in a foreign state for the purpose of evading the laws 
of his own state. * * * The record in this case shows with-
out conflict the action of Morningside College, if now 
brought in Iowa, would be barred by the Statute of Limi-
U.S. Fire Ins. Co. vs. S. R. and Mary M. Fleenor 7 
tations, and that the plaintiff would have a complete de-
fense thereto if sued in this state. To now compel him to 
defend this claim in another state, where the statute of 
limitations might not bar a recovery, would subject plain-
tiff to suffer irreparable injury. In Culp v. Butler, 69 Ind. 
App. 668, 122 N. E. 684, 685, the court said: 'By the 
admission in the answer that the statute of limitations has 
run against appellant's cause of action in Indiana, it clear-
ly appears that appellee has a complete defense thereto if 
sued thereon in this state. It further clearly appears, under 
8 * the rule stated above, that if * appellee would have no such 
defense to the action in Illinois, he would be liable to suf-
fer irreparable injury if compelled to defend such action in 
said state . . . These facts clearly bring the parties within 
the rule stated above with reference to enjoining a citizen. 
of one state from prosecuting an action against another 
citizen of the same state, in the courts of a foreign state, for 
the purpose of evading the law of his own state.' " 
In Cole vs. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 33 L. Ed. 538, 
82 ALR 666, the highest state court of Ma~sachusetts was up-
held in enjoining a citizen of that State from the further prose-
cution cf an attachment suit in New York, brought in accordance 
with its laws before a Massachusetts debtor had made an assign-
ment for benefit of creditors in his home state. 
Chief Justice Fuller says, on page 54 3 of L. Ed: 
"The jurisdiction of the English Court of Chancery 
to restrain persons within its territorial limits and under 
its jurisdiction from doing anything abroad, whether the 
thing forbidden be a conveyance or other act in pais, or the 
institution or the prosecution of in action in a foreign 
court. is well rettled. '' 
And, after stating the rule in this country as already quoted 
herein, says on page 544: 
"Such is undoubtedly the result of the clear weight 
of authority, and the rule has been often applied by the 
courts of the domicil against the attempts of some of its 
citizens to defeat the operation of its laws to the wrong and 
injury of others.'' 
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An early New York case is quoted from with approval, to 
the effect that generally its citizens will not be restrained from 
proceeding in an action in another state, but "there are excep-
tions to this rule, * * * and extreme delicacy should not deter 
the court from controlling the conduct of a party within its 
jurisdiction to prevent oppression or fraud. No rule of comity 
or policy forbids it." 
Another early New York case is cited as holding that an 
9* *€xpress company could maintain an action in New York 
to restrain the defendant, a resident of the State of New 
York, from prosecuting actions against the company in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, brought to avoid a decision of the Court of 
Appeals of New York, differing from the rule upon the same 
subject in the District of Columbia. 
Dehon vs. Foster, 4 Allen 545, is called in the opinion a 
leading case, and on pages 545-6 it is said that case "points out 
that the jurisdiction of a court, as a court of chancery, to res-
train persons within its jurisdiction from prosecuting suits, up-
on a proper case made, either in the courts of Massachusetts or 
in other States or foreign countries, rests on the clear authority 
vested in courts of equity over persons within the limits of their 
jurisdiction and amenable to process, to stay acts contrary to 
equity and good conscience; and that, as the decree of the court 
in such cases is directed solely at the party, it is wholly immater-
ial that such party is prosecuting his action in the courts of an-
other State or country." 
In the much later case of Bradford Elec. Light Co. vs. 
Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 76 L. Ed. 1026, Clapper, a resident of 
Vermont, was employed in that State by the Light Company, a 
corporation of the same State, as a lineman, for emergency ser-
vice in that State and in New Hampshire. While working in 
the latter State he was killed, and his administrator qualified in 
New Hampshire and sued in its state court to recover under its 
workmen's compensation law, which allowed an employee either 
to claim compensation or to sue for damages at common law, 
as modified by the act. In Vermont compensation only was re-
coverable under its workmen's compensation law. By 
1 o* reason of diversity of *citizenship of the New Hampshire 
administrator, the Light Company removed the suit to the 
federal court, and defended on the ground that the decedent's 
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employment was in Vermont, and that his recovery should be in 
acco.;:dance with its laws. There was no occasion for an in-
junction, since the suit was removed to the proper federal court 
no matte:; which state statute was applied. A recovery under 
the New Hampshire act was sustained by the Circuit Court of 
Appeals, but reversed on appeal. On one branch of the case, 
Mr. Justice Brandeis said for the whole court, on page 103 5: 
''By requiring that, under the circumstances here pre-
sented, full faith and credit be given to the public act of 
Vermont, the Federal Constitution prevents the employee 
or his representative from asserting in New Hampshire 
rights which would be denied him in the State of his resi-
dence and employment. A Vermont court could have en-
jo=ned Leon Clapper from suing the Company in New 
Hampshire, to recover damages for an injury suffered 
there, just as it would have denied him the right to recover 
such damages in Vermont. * * * The rights created by the 
Vermont Act are entitled to like protection when set up in 
New Hampshire by way of defanse to the action brought 
there. If this were not so, and the employee or his repre-
sentative were free to disregard the law of Vermont and his 
contract, the effectiveness of the Vermont Act would be 
gravely impaired." 
And on page 1036: ''But to rcfase to give effect to 
a substantive defense under the applicable law of another 
State, as under the circumstances here presented, subjects 
the defendant to irremediable liability. This may not be 
done.'' 
On page 1037 is this pertinent observation, which has been 
both followed and disregarded by certain state courts: 
"The interest of New Hampshire was only casual. 
Leon Clapper was not a resident there. He was not con-
tinuously employed there. So far as appears, he had no 
dependent there. It is difficult to see how the State's in-
terest would be subserved, under such circumstances, by 
burdening its courts with this litigation." 
While not dealing with the exact type of case here involved, 
Professor Lile, as early as 1921 had observed some of 
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11 * *the evils of the proceeding we complain of, for on page 
246 of his Notes on Equity Jurisprudence he says: 
"The ease with which transitory actions (in cop.tract 
or tort) may be instituted and prosecuted in a state other 
than that in which the cause of action arose, and the conse-
quent temptation to disreputable attorneys to institute ac-
tions in di&tant states, in order to embarrass the defendant 
in enforcing the attendance of his witnesses, and in the in-
creased expense of making defence, has produced in some 
sections of the country an evil that has met with the severe 
condemnation of the courts. Where it appears that such 
an action is contemplated, or has been already instituted, 
from sinister motives, the courts of the proper jurisdiction 
will not hesitate to enjoin the plaintiff from instituting or 
continuing the action." 
28 Am. Jur .. Injunctions, section 208, is to the effect that 
in England the relief has been granted to nonresidents, but that 
in this country the admitted power to do so is rarely exercised at 
thdr instance. 
The only case cited for the proposition is American Ex-
press Co. vs. Fox, 135 Tenn. 489, 187 S. W. 1117, Ann. Cas. 
1918B I 148, decided in 19 I 6. Th.at was an action to recover 
damages for personal injuries, which actions are of the transi-
tory class, while here the contract sued on is the new New York 
standard policy, approved by Code section 4305a, which re-
quires as a part of the policy the provision that it shall not be 
valid until countersigned by the duly authorized agent of the 
company at a designated place in the State; and by section 
4305f "all contracts of insurance on property in this State shall 
be deemed to have been made therein.'' The policy sued on here 
was, therefore, a Virginia statutory contract, and an action 
thereunder not strictly a transitory one. Under Code section 
6049. an action to recover a loss under a policy of insur-
12* ance *may be brought in any county or city "wherein the 
property insured was situated at the date of the policy." 
In the first suit brought in Tennessee by Fox, defendant re-
moved it to the federal court because of diversity of citizenship, 
where plaintiff took a nonsuit and later sued in Mississippi. 
When the express company sought, in a state court of Tennes-
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see, to enjoin prosecution of the suit in Mississippi, the Supreme 
Court emphas1zed that it "has not been willing to submit its 
rights to the courts of Tennessee in the matter of Fox's claim for 
damag.zs'' ; that if it in joined the Mississippi suit and Fox 
brought another suit in Tennessee for over $3,000.00, he would 
be without power to compel defendant to remain in the juris-
diction of the state court. That reason alone was given as suf-
f.cient to deny the injunction. Here less than $3,000.00 is in-
volved and no right of removal exists. 
The Tennessee court found "no evidence of fraud or op-
pression, nor any attempt to evade domiciliary laws." 
The court then says (page 1149 of Ann. Cas.): 
"Such injunctive relief as is here sought by the com-
plainant, in all the cases to which our attention has been 
called, has been accorded to citizens of a particular State in 
proceedings against citizens of the same State. We know 
of no case, reaching a court of last resort, where an injunc-
tion has been issued in behalf of a nonresident by the courts 
of any State to restrain a citizen of that State from suing 
the nonresident in another State. 
"We are not aware that this identical question has 
heretofore arisen, but· w~ think there are very good reasons 
why the jurisdiction invoked should not be exercised in 
favor of a nonresident, at least in a case involving such facts 
as the present one." 
On petition to rehear the court says: 
"We remain unshaken in the belief that such an in-
junction as is herein sought should not be granted to a 
nonresident complainant under the circumstances appear-
ing in this case." 
13 * * As will readily be observed, the facts and circumstances 
of that case had all to do with denying relief to the non-
resident plaintiff, and the principal of such circumstances was 
the fact of removal and that the express company would again 
"do that very thing." 
In the Clapper case (page 9 hereof) , decided by the United 
States Supreme Court sixteen years after the Tennessee decision, 
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a Vermont corporation was the equivalent of a complainant and 
a New Hampshire administrator the equivalent of a defendant. 
No mention was made of such a rule. 
In the express company case cited in Cole vs. Cunning-
ham (pages 8-9 hereof), it may have been a nonresident. At 
least the state of its incorporation is not mentioned in the opin-
ion citing it. 
To hold that a fire insurance company domesticated in 
Virginia, which cannot remove the particular case in question 
to the federal court if and when sued in a state court, which is 
required by statute to use the form of policy provided by its 
laws, and which by statute is a contract deemed to have been 
made in the State, and therefore a Virginia statutory contract, 
cannot maintain a suit because of nonresidence, would be to do 
violence to the reason and spirit of the general rule announced 
by the authorities cited herein. It is not so much who is the 
plaintiff, but that the complainant in such suit is subject to the 
process of the court in which the injunction is sought, and that 
the defendant is a citizen of that state. 
His duty, for instance, is not to evade the laws of his domi-
cile, no matter at whose instance the complaint may be made, 
so long as that complainant is subject to the process of the courts 
of the state of defendant's domicil. 
14 * *We think the "particular facts and circumstances" of 
the Fox case caused the court there to announce an un-
sound proposition, and one which was not necessary in reach-
ing its ultimate conclusion. 
It is sometimes said that an injunction will not issue for the 
sole reason that the decision of the foreign court may differ 
from that to be expected in the local courts. We submit that 
such should not be applied and held as law where, as here, a Vir-
ginia statutory contract is involved, as to which either party 
thereto is entitled to a Virginia construction under its statutes 
and decisions. In such a case there is no good reason why the 
defendant in the foreign suit should be compelled to plead Vir-
ginia statutes and decisions differing from those with which the 
other court is familiar, and under which it is accustomed to de-
ciding cases involving the loss of property in that State, when 
the plaintiff in such suit is a resident, citizen and employee of 
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Virginia, and is seeking to enforce in another jurisdiction a statu-
tory contract of his own State. 
15* *SPECIFIC REASONS FOR INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF 
I. Action on the policy barred in Virginia. The Vir-
ginia form of policy sued on provides that ''No suit or action 
on this policy, for the recovery of any claim, shall be sustain-
able in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements 
of this policy shall have been complied with, nor unless com-
menced within twelve months next after the fire." 
The amended bill in defendants' Tennessee suit alleges that 
"proper process was not issued and served" upon the insurance 
company, ccmplainant herein, on the original bill, and such is the 
fact. Process as to complainant here was not issued until March 
12, 1941, while the fire occurred December 22, 1939 (Tr. 1 I-). 
In a suit in Virgin:a, had the process been first issued and de-
livered to an officer for service on March 1 2, 1941, the suit 
would not have been commenced within twelve months after the 
fire. In the Tennessee chancery courts, the mere filing of a bill 
is the commencement of a suit, regardless of when process may 
be issued thereon, and in that State the suit is regarded as in-
stituted August 5, 1940, which is within twelve months after 
the fire. Not only is this admitted by the motion to dismiss the 
bill, the equivalent of a demurrer, but by the brief filed in the / 
trial court for defendants, in these words: ~ 
"Under the Tennessee law the filing of a bill in chan-
cery is the commencement of suit, without the service of 
process, and tolls the running of the statute of limitations. 
If no different cause of action is set up by an amended bill, 
it relates back and becomes a part of the original bill. This 
is admitted." 
Therefore, the effect of denying relief here is to deprive 
complainant of a right it has in the state of defendants' 
16* *residence, of the location of the property, and of the 
place of the contract. If the Tennessee suit was not 
brought to evade the law of Virginia in this and other respects 
(in that the original bill was filed within twelve months after 
the fire), the effect of denying relief will nevertheless be to so 
Q 
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£=vade that law. It is possible that the suit was advisedly brought 
within the period for so doing, and process purposely delayed. 
At any rate, when the suit was regarded as instituted under the 
Virginia rule, it was barred under the same rule and not barred 
in Tennessee, the effect of which is to deprive complainant of 
a valid defense it is entitled to make in Virginia, and thereby 
evade its laws. 
2. The amount of recovery differs in the two states. In 
Virginia complainant is liable only to the extent of the actual 
cash value of the property insured at the time of loss or damage 
(ascertained with proper deductions for depreciation), but not 
exceeding the cost of repairs with material of like kind and qual-
ity within a reasonable time after such loss or damage, without 
allowance for any increased cost of repairs or reconstruction by 
reason of any ordinance or law regulating construction or re-
pair, and in no event exceeding the face of the policy. This is 
the policy wording. 
The Tennessee bill, however, seeks to recover the face value 
of the policy (less the aforesaid $600.00), without regard to 
actual cash value of the building (Tr. 18, 19, 22, 26), and 
such is permitted as to building~ within the State under sections 
6172-74 of Williams Annotated Code of Tennessee, which are 
pleaded by the bill in this suit. The material parts of 
r 7 * * those sections are: 
6 1 72. Inspection of property insured. "Every agent, 
within ninety days after making or writing any contract of 
fire insurance on any building or structure in this state, 
shall cause the same to be personally inspected; and no com-
pany, and no officer or agent thereof, and no insurance 
broker, shall knowingly issue, negotiate, continue or renew 
or cause to permit to be issued, negotiated, continued or re-
newed any fire insurance policy upon property or interests 
therein within the state of an amount which, with any 
existing insurance therwn, exceeds the fair value of the 
property. (1927, ch. 72, sec. 1, Modified.)" 
6 r 73. Measure of damages; insured reimbursed. "If 
buildings within the state insured against loss by fire are 
totally destroyed by fire, the company shall not be liable 
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beyond the actual value of the insured property at the time 
of the loss or damage" * * * (lb., sec. 2). 
61 74. Result of failure to inspect. "However, if the 
agent fails to place a reasonable value on any such insured 
property within the ninety days, as aforesaid, and which 
is agreed to by the insured, and a loss occurs, in that event 
the value as shown by the policy or application shall be 
conclusively presumed to be reasonable, and settlement 
shall be made on that basis. (lb., Modified.) '' 
The fire occurred within thirty days of issuance of the pol-
icy sued on, but it was a renewal of another policy in the same 
company, and the Tennessee rule, as announced in the case of 
Lewis vs. Western Assur. Co., 175 Tenn. 3 7, 130 S. W. (2nd) 
982, is that "Defendant, having failed to inspect within the 
ninety day period, became liable for the face value of the policy. 
The renewal a year later * * * had the effect of extending the 
or:ginal contract for another year. * * * Defendant * * * had 
ninety days from date of issuance (of original policy) to in-
spect.'' 
If this statute should be applied, it may prevent the defense 
of fraud and false swearing in proof of loss (see 5 hereof) , be-
cause that ddense · would be immaterial if liability for the face 
of· the policy had attached by reason of failure to inspect 
1 8 * * and reduce the amount of insurance in force. 29 Am. 
Jur., Insurance section 1188; section 1134, page 852. 
In addition, both the original and amended bills ask for the 
recovery of a penalty for failure to settle promptly (Tr. 19, 
27). It is authorized in proper cases by section 6434 of Wil-
liams Code of Tennessee, which provides: 
6434. Additional liability upon insurers for failure 
to pay promptly insurance losses when refusal is not in good 
faith. "The insurance companies of this state, and foreign 
insurance companies and other persons doing an insurance 
bu]incss in this state, in all cases when a loss occurs and they 
refuse to pay the same within sixty days after a demand 
shall have been made by the holder of the policy on which 
said loss occurred, shall be liable to pay the holder of said 
policy. in addition to the loss and interest thereon, a sum 
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not exceeding twenty-five per cent. on the liability for said 
loss; provided, that it shall be made to appear to the court 
or jury trying the case that the refusal to pay said loss was 
not in good faith, and that such failure to pay inflicted ad-
ditional expense, loss, or injury upon the holder of said 
policy; and, provided, further, that such additional lia-
bility, within the limit prescribed, shall, in the discretion 
of the court or jury trying the case, be measured by the 
additional expense, loss, and injury thus entailed. ( 1901, 
h ' ) ,, c . 1 4 1 , rec. 1. 
The failure to settle a loss within the sixty day period af-
ter demand, places the burden upon the insurer to sho~ that 
such failure or refusal was in good faith. St. Paul etc. Co. vs. 
Kirkpatrick, I 29 Tenn. 5 5, 73, r 64 S. W. I I 86. 
3. Notice of foreclosure as a defense in the two states. Re-
calling that the policy sued on was issued Novem her 26, 193 9, 
and the fire December 22, 1939, the other dates and status of 
the debt and foreclosure, as alleged in section 1 4a of bill, by way 
of amendment (Tr. 3 1), brings this case within the rule of this 
State as announced in Horne lnsuance Co. vs. Berry, 175 Va. 
447, 9 S. E. (2nd) 290. If a suit is brought on the pol-
19* icy *in Virginia, this defense is a valid one. 
But this is not so in Tennessee, where the increased risk in-
cident to commencement of foreclosure proceedings or notice of 
sale under deed of trust is not recognized, and such a provision 
in a policy of insurance is there completely disregarded and ig-
nored. It seems to be the policy of that State not to enforce the 
provision, for in Insurance Company vs. Estes, 1 o·6 Tenn. 4 72, 
477, 62 S. W. 149, 52 LRA 9 I 5, 82 ASR 892, the court says: 
"We cannot perceive how, on principle, notice of fore-
closure of the mortgage or vendor's lien could have that ef-
fect (invalidating the policy) , notwithstanding such a stip-
ulation in the pol icy." (Underscoring ours.) 
Tennessee appears to be almost alone in this holding. 29 
Am. Jur., Insurance section 656, and notes cited. It is not to 
be assumed that its trial courts will follow the majority and the 
Virginia rule, in the light of the above decision of its highest 
court. 
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4. Estoppel against defendants. If an injunction is award-
ed by this court and defendants elect to sue in the courts of their 
own state on the policy, they will be confronted with the al-
legat:cns of their bill in chancery, under which they successfully 
set aside an award of appraisers and were awarded a recovery 
based upon total destruction of the same building now attempt-
ed to be again collected for as a total loss-two total losses of 
the same building, without repairs between fires. The allega-
tions of their first claim are taken from the bill filed in that case 
and are quoted on page 3 of transcript. We think it clear that 
they will not now in Virginia be heard to say the building was 
not a total loss as a result of the first fire. We are not ad-
20* vised what the Tennessee courts will *hold, but having 
litigated the first claim in this State, it is in the interest 
of uniformity of decision under a Virginia statutory contract 
that they ht required to face in the courts of this State their al-
legations theretofore made therein, and to abide the consequences . 
. 5· Fraud and false swearing. The Virginia form of pol-
icy involved provides that it shall be void "in case of any fraud 
or false swearing by the insured touching any matter relating to 
this insurance or the subject thereof, whether before or after a 
loss." 
The sworn proof of loss did not disclose a prior destruc-
tion of the property insured; claimed a cash value of the already 
destroyed building at from $3500.00 to $4,000.00, and loss and 
damage of from $2500.00 to $3,000.00 as a result of the sec-
ond fire, and the full $2,000.00 was demanded as their measure 
of loss and damage sustained (Tr. 5-6). 
The Virginia rule is that in dealing with the insurer, in-
cluding furnishing proofs of loss, the assured must observe the 
"utmost good faith, without which there can be no recovery"; 
and that if the sworn statements were known to be false or were 
recklessly made, upon a material matter, "the law presumes they 
were made with intent to deceive" and that "fraud in any part, 
or as to any items, of a formal statement of loss * * * operates 
to defeat a recovery". Va. Fire & Marine Ins. Co. vs. Vaugh-
an, 88 Va 832; 2nd Appeal, 102 Va. 541; Va. Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co. vs. Hogue, 105 Va. 355; Lavenstein vs. Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co., 125 Va. 191, 220; North British, etc. Co. vs. Nidif-
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, fer, 112 Va. 591, Ann. Cas. 1916 A 464; Globe and Rutgers 
""' t. Ins. Co. vs. Stallard (CCA, 4), 68 Fed. (2nd) 23 7, 29 Am. 
~ur., Insurance section 1134. 
21 * *This appears to have been also decided in the case of 
Dossett vs. First National Fire Insurance Company, 13 8 
Tenn.551, 558, 198 S. W. 889, but no general rule is announc-
ed in the case and no authorities are cited. Whether it may be 
said to have laid down a rule of decision for that State is not 
certain. 
The first loss on this property was litigated in this State, 
and we submit the second should be also, where swearing in the 
proof of loss ties into the first loss. 
6. "Occupied as a dwelling." The policy insured the des-
cribed building as being then occupied as a dwelling. It was un-
jnhabitable and was not then or since so occupied. 
As stated in 29 Am. Jur., Insurance section 690, 
"Where the insured property is described as occupied 
in a particular manner, and occupation in that manner is 
material to the risk, the insurance does not attach to the 
risk if the premises at the date of the contract are not and 
have not subsequently been so occup:ed. It has been con-
sidered that a description of a building as 'occupied as a 
dwelling' is a warranty which is broken where in fact the 
building was unoccupied. To a like effect, the holder of a 
policy of insurance on a dwelling house described in the 
policy as occupied by good tenants cannot recover for a loss 
if such house was in fact vacant when the policy was issued. 
A building is not 'occupied as a store' where, at the time of 
issuance of an insurance policy so describing it, a tenant has 
vacated it, although the owner contemplates resuming bus-
iness therein." 
For the underscored statement, Boyd vs. Vanderbilt Insur-
ance Company, 90 Tenn. 2 I 2, I 6 S. W. 470, 25 ASR 676, is 
cited, and the case so holds. The house had not been occupied 
for nearly a month before issuance of the policy and continued 
vacant until burned, nearly a year later. 
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The opinion in this case was by Judge (later Mr. Justice) 
Lurton, but was rendered prior to section 6126 of the 
22* Tennessee *Code, which reads as follows: 
6126. Misrepresentation or warranty will not avoid 
policy, when. "No written or oral misrepresentation or 
warranty therein made in the negotiations of a contract or 
policy of insurance, or in the application therefor, by the 
assured or in his behalf, shall be deemed material or defeat 
or vo:d the policy or prevent its attaching. unless such mis-
representation or warranty is made with actual intent to 
deceive, or unless the matter represented increase the risk 
of lo:;s. (lb., sec. 22) ." 
We are unable to state what the Tennessee courts will hold 
in considering a like case since the statute quoted. 
3 Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (2nd Ed.) 2073, is to the 
effect that "occupied as a dwelling" in a policy must be construed 
as a warranty of actual occupancy. 
Section 94 of Richards on Insurance (4th Ed.) is to the 
effect that a warranty "that the building insured was a dwelling 
house, or o·ccupied as a dwelling, when in fact it was not, would 
avoid the policy." 
The only Virginia case found, which m;iy throw any light 
on the question, is Connecticut Fire Insurance Company vs. 
Tilley, 88 Va. 1024, but it did not involve the exact question 
before us. The policy there insured eight double tenement 
houses in the sum of $ 187.50 each. The policy provided that 
it should become void if the premises became unoccupied and so 
rema~ned for more than ten days without endorsement of con-
sent thereon. Eight of the tenements were vacant when the pol-
icy was issued; shortly thereafter all became unoccupied, eight 
were later occupied, and a like number vacant at time of fire. In 
addition to the ten day clause, the policy apparently showed on 
its face that the company understood it was insuring vacant 
property, but allowing twenty days in order to effect occupa-
tion thereof, or as the court says during which period the com-
pany agreed to waive the non-occupancy clause. The 
23 * court held *plaintiff entitled to recover as to the eight 
houses occupied at time of fire, and not entitled to recov-
er as to those vacant. 
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The effect of this decision appears to be that if the twenty 
day provision for occupancy had not been in the policy, and the 
insurance had been issued while they were vacant, there would 
have been no waiver of the vacancy provision. There eight of 
the houses were. never occupied after the twenty days allowed 
for the purpose, and the specific question before us was not there 
involved. 
The Virginia warranty statute, section 4220, applies on-
ly where there is an application for a policy, but in any event it 
seems not to affect this case, because the building was not in fact 
occupied. 
7. Examination of insured. The prompt demand made 
by complainant upon Samuel R. Fleenor, after furnishing proof 
of loss, that he submit to an examination under oath, as pro-
vided by the policy, and his failure to comply with that request 
will be found set out on page 6 of transcript. 
The provision in the standard policy is that "the insured 
* * * shall * * * submit to examination under oath by any per-
son named by this company and subscribe the same." 
While no case on the subject has been found by the appel-
late courts of either Virginia or Tennessee, the rule is general to 
the effect that submission of insured to the examination is re-
garded as a condition precedent to his recovery; at least he will 
not be heard by a court until the demand is complied with. 29 
Arn. Jur., Insurance section Ir 27. 
Whether, if complainant is required to defend the suit in 
Tennessee, the courts of that State will hold in accord-
24 * ance * with the general rule as to a policy issued in another 
state is not known. Since the policy is a Virginia con-
tract and the assured a resident of that State and demand was 
made for examination therein under said policy, we contend an-
other reason exists for requiring defendants to assert their rights 
in an appropriate court of this State. 
It would doubtless have been proper in this suit to ask for 
a declaratory judgment fixing complainant's liability under the 
policy, but complainant has elected not to ask for that relief in 
addition to an injunction. If the injunction is a warded by this 
court, defendants will be free to bring their action at law in a 
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court of proper jurisdiction in their State and to have a jury trial 
if they so desire. 
It is respectfully spbmitted that the facts of this case bring 
complainant within the rule of law ·entitling it to the perman-
ent injunction prayed for. 
*CONCLUSION 
A copy of this petition was mailed George N. Barnes, Esq., 
Johnson City, Tennessee, attorney of record for defendants, on 
June 12, I 941. Original petition and transcript will be deliver-
ed to the Chief Justice at Abingdon. 
An oral presentation of this petition will be requested. 
If an appeal is granted, this petition will be adopted as the 
opening brief. 
For the foregoing, and other reasons to be assigned at bar, 
petitioner prays that an appeal be awarded it, and that upon 
final hearing the decree complained of be reversed, and final 
judgment be entered in this court injoining and prohibiting de-
fendants from the further prosecution of the pending suit in 
Tennessee, and from the institution of any other suit or action 
under the policy in question except in one of the courts of this 
State. 
UNITED ST A TES FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
DONALD T. STANT, 
BRADLEY ROBERTS, 
Attorneys for Petitioner. 
By Counsel. 
I, Donald T. Stant, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in my opinion the 
final decree of the Corporation Court of the City of Bristol, 
Virginia, in the foregoing suit should be reviewed by said court. 
Given under my hand this 12th day of June, 1941. 
DONALD T. STANT. 
Received June I 7, 194 I. 
P. W. C. 
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Appeal allowed. Bond $500.00. 
PRESTON W. CAMPBELL. 
July 14, 1941. 
To the Clerk at Richmond. 
Received July 15, 194 I. 
M.B.W. 
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RECORD 
---,o---
United States Fire Insurance Company 
vs. 
Samuel R. Fleenor and Mary M. Fleenor 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit, on the 7th day 
of May, 1941, the above named complainant filed its bill in 
chancery and exhibits in the Clerk's office of the Corporation 
Court for the City of Bristol, Virginia, against the above named 
defendants, which bill, motion to dismiss and all other proceed-
ings had in said cause, are in the words and figures following, to-
wit: 
page 2 ] ORIGINAL BILL, Filed May 7, 1941 
To the Honorable Jos. L. Cantwell, Jr., Judge: 
Complainant above named, a corporation of the State of 
New York, domesticated and doing business in the State of Vir-
ginia, respectfully shows unto the court as follows: 
I. Prior to and on March 3 o, 1 9 3 1, the a hove named de-
fendants owned a lot on Chester Street in said City of Bristol, 
and a frame dwelling house thereon, which dwelling was in-
sured against loss by fire in the aggregate sum of $5,000.00. 
On March 30, 1931, said dwelling was badly damaged by fire. 
Being unable to agree upon the loss and damage sustained, ap-
praisers were appointed by defendants and the three insurance 
carriers, which resulted in an award of $2194. 15 as the loss and 
damage sustained by said fire. Defendants herein were dissatis-
fied with the appraisal and brought separate actions at law 
against the insurance carriers in the Circuit Court of Washing-
ton County, Virginia, in which no reference was made to the 
appraisals and awards. This fact being brought to the attention 
of the court, on motion of the insurance carriers, the 
page 3 ] suits were transferred to the chancery side of said 
court, and the pleadings amended accordingly. The 
complainant was not one of the insurers. In the chancery suit 
the awards were held invalid for technical reasons, and a de-
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cree was entered awarding judgment in the sum of $3 250.00, 
with interest thereon from June 1, 193 1, as a part of the dam-
age, subject to credit in the amount of the awards, which amounts 
had been paid by the insurance carriers to the mortgagee named 
in the policies, under the terms of standard mortgage clause at-
tached to each of said policies. 
On September 18, 1933, the Supreme Court of Appeals re-
fused the appeal prayed for by said insurance carriers, being of 
opinion that the decree of the trial court was plainly right. 
One of the paragraphs of said bill in chancery made the 
fo]owing allegations: 
12. Complainants, represent that the damage suffered 
by complainants is far in excess of the amount of the award 
made by the appraisers, and is not less than $4500.00; that the 
residence of the complainants was practically destroyed by fire 
and that it now has no market value whatever; and that it is not 
worth the cost of removal from the site; that the lot on which 
the same is situated will bring as much on the market as the lot 
and the remaining portion of the residence: and that the actual 
damage sustained by complainants is the value of the entire resi-
dence building, and that your complainants are entitled to the 
payment of the entire amount of such loss and damage." 
Plaintiff himself, and certain of his witnesses, testified in 
said suit in accordance with the allegations above quoted. 
2. At some time after March 30, 1931, but not coninu-
ously, complainant is advised that defendants occu-
page 4 ] pied one or more of the first floor rooms of said resi-
dence. The building was not torn down until fol-
lowing sale under deed of trust hereinafter referred to, nor was it 
repaired, so far as outside appearances indicated. The fire did 
not burn through the front or sides of the framing, and a strang-
er to the property, casually passing along the street in front, in 
all probability would not have discovered the fact of the prior 
fire, the lot and dwelling house being high above Chester Street. 
While in the same condition as immediately after the fire, 
as complainant is advised, and perhaps while vacant and unoc-
cupied as a dwelling, or otherwise, on November 26, 1935, de-
fendants negotiated a loan of $ 1500.00, which was represented 
by their note secured by deed of trust on the lot and such im-
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provements as were there. The lender, as complainant is ad-
vised, was in ignorance of the prior fire and the real condition 
of the building, the loan being made upon the faith of the 
building being one not already badly damaged by fire, and was 
likewise in ignorance of the prior payment by said insurance 
companies. It is complainant's information that none of these 
things was disclosed by defendants at the time the loan was 
made, and that the lot, without any improvements, was not suf-
ficient to secure the loan. 
Complainant is advised that at the time the loan was se-
cured, fire insurance was taken out by or for the defendants and 
kept in force, as required by the terms of the deed of trust, but 
if so: such insurance was not in or with this complainant, until 
the policy preceding that described in the next section hereof. 
page 5 ] 3. At the instance of defendants, or someone for 
them, on November 26, 193 9, complainant issued 
its renewal policy No. 14909. for $2,000.00 to defendants, in 
which said property was described as a building occupied as a 
dwelling, and it was thereby insured against direct loss and 
damage by fire for its actual cash value, not exceeding the face 
amount of $2,000.00. Attached to the policy was a standard 
mortgage clause, payable to J. C. Leonard, Trustee, as his in-
terest may appear, he being the Trustee in deed of trust securing 
said loan of$ 1500.00. When the agent issuing said policy was 
informed that a loan of $ 1 500.00 was being made on the prop-
erty, he assumed the building to be worth as much as the de-
sired insurance of $2,000.00, and issued the policy without an 
inspection of the premises. At the date of such frsuance, the 
building was vacant and unoccupied, but this fact was unknown 
to complainant and to the agent issuing said policy. 
4. On December 22, 1939, what remained of the build-
ing was again damaged or destroyed by fire at a time when it 
continued to be vacant and unoccupled, and merely an abandon-
ed and uninhabitable building, without electricity or heating 
plant, and this condition had existed, so far as is known to com-
plainant, s:nce the first fire. Purported proof of loss duly 
sworn to was furnished by defendants, following said fire, in 
which the fact that the building was not occupied at the time of 
fire was disclosed, but not the length of such vacancy and lack 
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of occupancy. The cash value of the building insured was in 
said proof of loss claimed to be from $3500.00 to 
page 6 ] $4,000.00 and loss and damage of froll} $2500.00 
to $3,000.00, as a result of the fire. Consequently 
the full amount of the policy, $2,000.00, was claimed and de-
manded by defendants as the measure of their loss and damage. 
5. On February 6, 1940, complainant demanded in writ-
ing of defendant, S. R. Fleenor, that he submit to an examina-
tion under oath and subscribe the same, in accordance with the 
terms of complainant's policy, under which he was making 
claim, and designated February Io, 1940, as the t1me, and also 
designated the place for such examination in Bristol, Virginia, 
but offered to fix another date if the one suggested was not satis-
factory. A Virginia attorney was forthwith employed by de-
fendants, and by letter dated the following day and delivered to 
complainant's counsel, its right to require such examination was 
denied. Later said attorney agreed that S. R. Fleenor would 
submit to the examination. One day after another was agreed 
upon, but said Fleenor did not appear on any of said dates. 
Finally, on March 4, 1940, the following letter was written by 
complainant's counsel and delivered to counsel for defendants 
herein: 




Re: S. R. and Mary M. Fleenor, 
Fire, December 22, 1939 
"We agreed on Friday, the 1st, that this examination un-
der oath was not to be conducted on the 2nd. I am leaving 
town again tonight and should return on Friday, the 8th. There-
after I will conduct the examination at any time you suggest. 
provided one or two days notice of the time is given me." 
Thereafter no date for such examination was ever suggest-
ed by defendants or their counsel, and said Fleenor 
page 7 ] has not yet submitted himself for the said examina-
tion under oath. Complainant is advised that the 
services of defendant's then counsel have been dispensed with 
by them. 
U.S. Fire Ins. Co. vs. S. R. and Mary M. Fleenor 27 
6. On February 20, 1940, complainant was first advis-
ed that J. C. Leonard, Trustee in the deed of trust aforesaid, had 
employed attorneys in connection with his claim under the stan-
dard mortgage clause attached to the policy. No settlement was 
reached, and on May Io, 1940, there was served upon the Sec-
retary of Commonwealth of the State of Virginia, as statutory 
agent fo.· complainant, a notice of motion for judgment by said 
Leonard as Trustee, returnable in the Circuit Court of Washing-
ton County, Virginia, in which suit judgment for $1521. 7 4, 
th€ balance due under said deed of trust indebtedness, and being 
the extent of the Trustee's interest, was asked. 
Being advised that any defenses which it might have against 
defendants as the assured under said policy were possibly not 
valid defenses against the Trustee, negotiations were entered in-
to which resulted in a compromise settlement of the Trustees 
suit for $600.00, and said amount was paid him on June 24, 
I 940. Notice of motion for judgment not. having been filed 
and docketed, no order was entered in said suit, but the Trustee 
and beneficiary under the deed of trust executed a joint release 
covering their interest in the policy and any amounts paid or 
payable thereunder. No effort was made to settle any addition-
al right of action which defendants might have or assert by rea-
rnn of the policy and the fire, Complainant was unable to se-
cure the policy at the time, and is advised it is now in possession 
of defendants. 
page 8 ] At a later date said Leonard, Trustee, advertised and 
sold the lot, and what remained of building after both 
fires, for the sum of $1,000.00, as complainant is advised, such 
sum being secured only by reason of prior negotiations by the 
Trustee for its purchase. 
7. On July 12, 1940, J. D. Baumgardner, Attorney-at-
law of Bristol, Tennessee, advised complainant that defendants 
were making claim under the policy. Complainants counsel ex-
plained all known facts to Mr. Baumgardner, beginning with 
the first fire and settlement, and advised him that no further or 
additional amount would voluntarily be paid under the policy. 
On August 5, 1940, represented by Talbert Hughes, an 
attorney of Johnson City, Tennessee, complainants filed a bill 
in the chancery court at Bristol, Tennessee, against S. K. M. 
Agency, Fred E. Smith, its manager, and J. C. Leonard, Trus-
tee, and this complainant. No process on said bill was issued 
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against, or served upon complainant, and no appearance was 
entered by it, or pleading filed in its behalf. The bill made no 
mention of the prior fire, or insurance paid under the policies 
then in force. Total loss of the building was alleged, and the 
full amount of $2,000.00 demanded of this complainant, to-
gether with interest from date of fire, and a statutory penalty, 
prov."ded by the laws of the State of Tennessee, was demanded. 
Defendant Smith, manager of S. K. M. Agency, filed a de-
murrer to the bill on August 22, 1 940, on the ground that no 
cause of action was stated against him, and no relief sought. 
On the same day, defendant Leonard filed a demur-
page 9 ] rer and motion to dismiss. 
About February, I 94 I, said demurrers and motion 
were argued before the court in which said suit is pending, and 
verbally sustained, but no decree entered thereon. 
8. On March 12, I 94 I, complainants in said suit, de-
fendants herein, filed their amended bill against this complainant 
and J. C. Leonard, Trustee, but no process was asked or issued 
as to or against defendant Smith. Process to answer the origin-
al and amended bill was served upon this complainant in Sul-
livan County, Tennessee, by delivering a copy of same to a Jo:al 
general agent for the issuance of policies, residing in Sullivan 
County, Tennessee, which is one of the approved methods of 
such service according to the laws of that State. On the first 
Monday in April, I 941, the rules to which said process was re-
turnable, complainant filed a plea in abatement to the jurisdic-
tion of said court, which has not yet been called up for argument 
or passed upon. No other pleading has been filed in said suit by 
complainant, and no subsequent proceedings taken or had as 
to it. 
page Io ] 9. As has already appeared in part from the al-
legations hereof, complainant alleges that defend-
ants herein were residents of the City of Bristol, Virginia, and 
actually domiciled therein at the time the policy now involved 
was issued, at the time of the second fire, and now, and defend-
ant Samuel R. Fleenor is now employed by one of the depart-
ments of the State of Virginia, his work being confined to the 
State. The building insured was located in said City and State, 
and all questions arising under the policy sued upon in Tennes-
sE:e are governed by the laws of Virginia. Said policy is a statu-
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tory contract known as the new form of standard New Yark 
policy, issued as required by section 4305a of the Code of Vir-
ginia, which statutory form requires the provision that the pol-
icy shall not be valid until countersigned by a duly authorized 
agent of the company at Bristol, Virginia, and complainant al-
l~ges that the policy was in fact issued and countersigned by one 
of its Virginia agents as such. 
By another section, 4 3 o 5 f, it is provided that all contracts 
of insurance on property in this State shall be deemed to have 
been made therein. The policy is, therefore, a Virginia statu-
tory policy contract, and the rights and liabilities of the parties 
thereto are governed by the statutes of Virginia and the decisions 
of the highest court of the State. As will appear from the al-
legations of the Tennessee original and amended bills, the face 
value of Jhe policy is claimed in the suit pending in that State, 
apparently under sections 6172-74 of Williams Annotated Code, 
wh:ch are hereby expressly pleaded and shown to the court. Un-
der the laws of the State of Virginia, complainant is not liable 
beyond the actual cash value of the property in-
page 11 ] sured, regardless of the face amount of the policy, 
or the length of time it may have been in force. 
1 o. The policy sued on provides, as to time of bringing 
suit, in lines 192-196, as follows: 
"No suit or action on this policy, for the recovery of any 
claim, shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless 
all the requirements of this policy shall have been complied with, 
nor unless commenced within twelve months next after the fire." 
The amended Tennessee bill alleges as to original bill, that 
°'proper process was not issued and served" upon the complain-
ant herein. and such is a fact. Process as to this complainant to 
answer the original and amended bill was not issued until March 
12, 1941, while the fire occurred December 22, 1939. 
Any action on the policy in Virginia would have, under 
these facts, been barred at the time of the afotesaid issuance of 
process against this complainant in the Tenner.see suit, because 
the suit would not have been commenced within the period of 
one year following fire, as provided by policy. Complainants 
are advised that the Tennessee rule in its chancery courts is that 
the mere filing of a bill is the commencement of a suit, and, 
therefore, to allow defendants to proceed further in the Tennes-
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see suit would result in depriving complainant of a legal defense 
which it is justly entitled to assert on its Virginia contract. Com-
plainant alleges upon information and behef that it is the pur-
pose er detendants in instituting the suit in Tennessee to evade 
the local law of the State of their residence and of the place of 
contract, and that they seek to obtain in said suit relief to which 
they are not entitled in the State of Virginia. Cer-
page 12 ] tain judgments have been rende::ed and docketed 
against them in the Clerk's office of the City of their 
residence, and it is believed that this fact may have something to 
do with the place of suit. Whether they so intended or not, the 
effect of their action, if they are allowed to proceed further, will 
be to enable them to obtain such advantage and to evade the 
laws of th~ State of Virginia. 
1 1. Complainants are advised that the description in the 
policy of the building, as "occupied as a dwelling" amounted to 
a warranty under the laws of Virginia, that it was actually and 
physically occupied as such at the time of issuance of the policy, 
and that under the facts herein alleged, such covenant or war-
ranty was broken as soon as made, and that its effect was to 
avoid any legal liability under the policy. 
I 2. As will appear from the bill and amended bill in the 
Tennessee suit, a penalty is demanded in any judgment which 
·may be rendered by reason of the policy. Complainant alleges 
that the courts of Tennessee are authorized by statute to include 
in such judgments a penalty not exceeding 25 % for delayed set-
tlements under policies of insurance, and that there is no such 
statutory provision in the State of Virginia. 
On the other hand, complainant is liable only to the ex-
tent of the actual cash value of property insured at the time of 
loss or damage (ascertained with proper deductions for deprecia-
tion), but not exceeding the amount which it would cost to re-
pair or replace the same with material of like kind and quality 
within a reasonable time after such loss or damage, 
page 1 3 ] without allowance for any increased cost of repair 
or reconstruction by reason of any ordinance or law 
regulating construction or repair, and in no event exceeding the 
face of the policy. 
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I 3. Complainant further ~hows unto the court that, ac-
cording to its information, advice and belief, it is entitled to re-
quire either of the named assured to submit to an examination 
under oath before they will be allowed to proceed with a suit 
under the policy. It is believed that the courts of another state 
may net feel justified in refusing to proceed with a suh on a 
policy ii.1:ied in another state. and that in all probability com-
p!ainant will be deprived of that right if defendants are allowed 
to proceed with tht Tennessee suit against it. As already point-
ed out herein, defendant, S. R. Fleenor, has failed to comply 
with the demand for examination under oath made upon him 
in accordance with the terms of the policy. 
If the question of any further liability is determined in the 
courts of th;s State. complainant is advised that defendants will 
be estopped to claim that the building was not practically des-
troyed in the first fire, and that following such fire it had no 
market value, and such will be one of complainant's defenses, 
in case defendants are enjoined from the further prosecution of 
their $Uit against this complainant in Tennessee, and in event 
they later sue on the policy in the courts of the State of Virginia. 
14. Under the terms of the contract sued on, the policy is 
void in case of any fraud or false swearing by the 
page 14 ] assured touching any matter relating to the insur-
ance or the subject thereof, eitber before or after a 
loss. Complainant will contend, if occasion arises in a suit 
brought in Virginia, that the proof of loss filed by defendants 
under this policy is a violation of said clause of the policy, by 
reason of the known exhorbitant and excessive sworn claim as 
to loss set out in clause 4 hereof. 
15. And generally, complainant is advised that the courts 
of the state in which defendants are domiciled and have their 
re~idence, and in wh:ch the property was located when insured, 
and at the time of the fire, by a statutory Virginia contract, have 
the authority and power to enjoin its citizens, including de-
fendants herein, from further prosecuting the Tennessee suit 
herein described, and from asserting liability against complain-
ant herein under the policy except in the courts of the state of 
their residence and domicile: that to allow the further prosecu-
tion of the Tennessee suit in question would be to allow an in-
equitable act and a positive wrong and injury to complainant, 
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and would deprive it of the benefit of laws and decisions of the 
State of Virginia. Complainant is further advised that this 
court has the power to compel its own citizens to respect its laws 
and to assert any claim which they may have in the courts of 
their State. 
Complainant shows that the complainants in the Tennessee 
suit are the same as those involved in the first fire and settlement 
herein described, and it files as exhibits to this bill, to be read and 
considered as a part hereof, a copy of the original bill, of the 
amended bill in said Tennessee suit, and of com-
page I 5 ] plainant' s plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of 
that court filed therein. 
I 6. Complainant, therefore, prays that all proper pro-
cess be issued in this suit; that defendants be required to answer 
this bill, but their answers under oath are waived; that a tem-
porary injunction be awarded restraining and prohibiting de-
fendants from further prosecuting the Tennessee suit herein re-
ferred to, so far as concerns this complainant, and from institut-
ing or prosecuting any other action, suit or proceeding upon the 
policy herein described, except in one of the courts of this State 
having jurisdiction thereof, and that such injunctioi:i be made 
permanent. 
And complainant prays for such other and further relief 
as the equities of its case may require and to a court of equity 
may seem meet and proper; and complainant prays for general 
relief. 
UNITED ST A TES FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
By DONALD ST ANT 
Attorney 
DONALD ST ANT, 
BRADLEY ROBERTS, 
Counsel for Complainant. 
page I 6 ] State of Virginia, 
City of Bristol: 
I, Dan Drinkard, Clerk of the Corporation Court for the 
City of Bristol, Virginia, do certify that H. H. McFern this day 
made oath before me that he is the duly authorized adjuster for 
United States Fire Insurance Company, complainant in the fore-
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going bill; that he has been authorized to cause this suit to be 
instituted: that he is familiar with the allegations of the bill 
about to be filed therein, and that the allegations therein are true 
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief. 
Given under my hand this the 7th day of May, I 941. 
DAN DRINKARD, Clerk. 
EXHIBIT TO BILL 
U.S. F. I. Co. vs. Fleenor 
To the Honorable S. E. Miller, Chancellor, holding the Chan-
cery Court at Bristol, Sullivan County, Tennessee 
Samuel R. Flernor and wife, Mary M. Fleenor, 
residents of Bristol, Washington County, Va. Complainants 
vs. 
S. K. M. Agency, an insurance agency of Bristol, 
Tennessee and Fred E. Smith, as Manager of said 
Agency, of Bristol, Tennessee; J. C. Leonard, 
Trustee, resident of Bristol, Sullivan County, 
Tenn. United States Fire Insurance Company, a 
foreign corporation, with principal place of busi-
ness in New York City, New York. Defendants 
Complainants respectfully show to the Court: 
I. 
That Complainants were the owners of a certain two story 
frame dwelling house situated at or known as No. 6 19 Chester 
Street, Bristol, Virginia. The lot upon which said dwelling 
was locatzd, being on the north side of said street adjoining the 
lot of Edwards on the east and the lot of Pippin on the west. 
Said house and lot is, or was, valuable property and reasonably 
worth Seventy-Five Hundred ($7,500.00) Dollars. The orig-
inal deed or duly certified copy of same will be offered in proof 
at the hearing hereon. 
II. 
That on the 26th day of November, 1935, Complainants 
executed a certain deed of trust to the Defendant, J. C. Leonard, 
34 Supreffie Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Jr., Trustee, and which said deed of trust was executed to secure 
a certain note of even date therewith in the sum of Fifteen Hun-
dred ($1500.00) Dollars. Thereafter credits were made for 
two payments of One Hundred ($I 00.00) Dollars each on 
principal and accrued interest was paid up until May 26, 193 9. 
A copy of the said note showing the credits of payments for both 
principal and intere~t is filed herewith as Exhibit A, and a copy 
of the deed of trust is filed herewith as Exhibit B. 
III. 
Complainants further show, that on November 26, 193 9, 
the Defendant United States Fire Insurance Company issued its 
policy No. 14909 in the sum of Two Thousand ($2,000.00) 
Dollars, insuring said property against loss by fire, and that 
said policy was issued by the company's local agen-
page 18 ] cy, S. K. M. Agency in Bristol, Tennessee. That 
the said policy was a renewal of a policy in a like 
amount which had been carried on said property for several 
years. 
IV. 
That on the 22nd day of December, 1939, while said in-
surance was in full force, and effect, the said dwelling house was 
destroyed by fire. The building is a total loss. Such salvage 
as remains having no saleable value. Your complainants allege 
that at the time of said loss, the said dwelling house was worth 
a sum in excess of Two Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars for 
which it was then insured. The contents material to show this 
as a policy of insurance, insuring against the loss sustained, will 
be proven on the hearing hereon. 
V. 
After the occurrence of the fire, as hereinbefore shown, the 
said J. C. Leonard, .Jr., Trustee, filed a bill or petition against 
the said United States Fire Insurance Company in the Circuit 
Court of Washington County, Virginia, in which he claimed 
judgment in the sum of $1,521.74 as of the date of said fire. 
Complainants were in no way consulted about the filing of this 
suit, neither as to why it was filed, or when it was filed, why 
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it was not prosecuted and the alleged compromise made for the 
sum of Six Hundred ($600.00) Dollars. Complainants are 
advised, however, that the Defendants, J.C. Leonard, Jr., Trus-
tee, and the United States Fire Irtsurance Company did enter in-
to an agreement for such an amount, and that upon payment of 
said amount, said J. C. Leonard, Jr., Trustee, advertised the 
lot, upo~1 which the house had formerly been located, for sale. 
That at or before such time, the said J.C. Leonard, Jr., Trustee, 
had ascertained the amount a certain prospective buyer would 
pay for the said lot, and that said J. C. Leonard, Jr., Trustee, 
in collusion with the said United States Fire Insurance Com-
pany, agreed to accept only such amount as was necessary to 
pay t.be debt ot the holder of the note secured by said deed of 
trust, including attorney fees and commissions to said J. C. 
Leonard, Jr., Trustee, without regard to the value or amount 
of the loss sustained, and in utter disregard of the 
page I 9 ] rights of your Complainants. 
VI. 
That at this time the said J. C. Leonard, Jr., Trustee, has 
~aid lot advertised for sale on Monday August 5, 1940, at 
11 :oo o'clock A. M., and that same will be sold at that time, 
causing irreparable loss to your Complainants unless such sale is 
stayed by fiat of your Honor for injunction. That on account 
of the different parties in interest and the attempted settlement 
ex parte so far as Complainants are concerned between the De-
fendants and in which it is atetmpted to burden the Complain-
ants with attorney fees, commissions, and court costs which are 
not necessary and not done with any intent to protect the in-
terest of your Complainants, it is deemed necessary to bring this 
suit in order that the rights of all parties concerned may be heard 
and determined. 
Premises Complainants pray: 
1. That subpoena to answer issue be served upon De-
fendants named, requiring each of them to answer, but oath to 
their answer is waived, that if necessary publication to be had 
for the non-resident Defendant. 
2. That an account be taken and stated as to the amount 
due on the note secured by the deed of trust, that proof be heard 
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and that Complainants have judgment for the full amount of 
the loss sustained by the destruction of said house up to the full 
amount of said policy and including interest on such amount 
from the date of said fire and pe·nalty for failure to pay prompt-
ly as provided in said policy, together with all costs of this cause. 
3. That an injunction issue restraining and prohibiting 
the said J. C. Leonard, Jr., Trustee his agents or attorneys, from 
selling said property or making any further attempt to sell same 
until the further orders of this Court. 
4. That your complainants have all such other, further 
and different relief as they may be entitled to, and they pray for 
general relief. 
This is the first application for an injunction in this case. 
SAMUEL R. FLEENOR. 
MARY M. FLEENOR, 
By T. B. HUGHES. Atty. 
TALBERT B. HUGHES, Solicitor. 
page 20 ] State of Trnnessee, 
Washington County: 
Samuel R. Fleenor makes oath that the statements in his 
foregoing bill, made of his knowledge are true, and those made 
on information and belief he verily believes to be true. 
SAMUEL R. FLEENOR 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this August 3, 1940. 
TALBERT B. HUGHES, 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires the 7th day of March, 1941. 
True Copy-Original Bill-No. 1 1 24. 
Filed: 1 o: 20 A. M .. August 5, 1940. 
page 21 ] 
T. H. HODGE, Com. 
EXHIBIT TO BILL 
U. S. F. I. Co. vs. Fleenor 
To the Honorable S. E. Miller, Chancellor, holding the Chan-
cery Court at Bristol. for Sullivan County, Tennessee: 
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Samuel R. Fleenor and wife, Mary M. Fleenor, 
residents of Bristol, Washington County, Va. Complainants 
vs. 
S. K. M. Agency, an insurance agency of Bristol, 
Tennessee, and Fred E. Smith, as manager of said 
agency, of Bristol, Tennessee, J. C. Leonard, 
Trustee, resident of Bristol, Sullivan County, 
Tennessee, and United States Fire Insurance Com-
pany, a foreign corporation, with principal place 
of business in New York City, New York, Defendants 
Your Complainants Would Respectfully Show Unto the Court: 
I. 
That heretofore, on August 5th, 1 940, they filed their 
original bill in this cause, alleging among other things as fol-
lows: That they were the owners of certain property in Bris-
tol, Va., and upon which a valuable house or residence had been 
erected, and with a description thereof. That theretofore, com-
plainants had executed a trust conveyance on said property to 
J. C. Leonard, as Trustee, and securing Mrs. Kate T. Horton, 
Committee in the sum of$ 1500.00, and upon which note pay-
ments had been made of $200.00, and interest payments to May 
19.3 9. That an insurance policy was carried on said house in 
the sum of $2,000.00, being written by the defendant, United 
States Fire Insurance Company, and written by the S. K. M. 
Agency of Bristol, Tennessee, the local agent of said defendant 
company, and which said· policy contained a mortgage clause 
showing that said insurance in case of fire, was pay-
page 22 ] able to your complainants and to the said J. C. 
Leonard, Trustee, as their interests may appear. 
That on the 22nd day of Dec~mber, 1939, and while said in-
surance policy was in force, said building was totally destroyed 
by fire, and that the loss sustained was more than the face of the 
policy, so that thereupon a right of action accrued to your com-
plainants and to the said J. C. Leonard, Jr., Trustee, for the 
face value of the policy. That after the fire occurred, the said 
J. C. Leonard, Jr., Trustee, filed a suit against the United States 
Fire Insurance Company for an amount of $ 1i;21. 7 4. the 
amount claimed to ht due him as trustee, and that this was done 
without making them a party complainant, giving them notice 
of the filing of suit, or consulting them with reference thereto, 
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and that at a later date, without their knowledge, consultation, 
or consent, compromised the claim for $600.00. and released 
the defendant, Insurance Company, so far as his suit and in-
terest was concerned. That at or before this compromise was 
reached, said J. C. Leonard, Jr., Trustee, had caused to be ad-
vertised, the property herein set out for sale, and acted in col-
lusion with the insurance company and in bad faith toward the 
complainants in said transactions. It was also averred that the 
property was thereafter sold and damages accruing to the com -
plainants by reason thereof, and asked for the collection of the 
balance due them on said insurance contract from the defendant, 
United States Fire Insurance Company, and for damages as to 
J. C. Leonard, Jr. as Trustee, and for an accounting by the said 
J. C. Leonard, Jr., as Trustee, it being averred that he was the 
agent of the holder of the note, and that proper credits had not 
been given. Process was asked for the defendants, and by over-
sight and error on the part of different parties, proper process 
was not issued and served, especially as to the defendant, insur-
ance company. The allegations of the original bill is here re-
ferred to and it is asked that this amendment relate 
page 2 3 ] back to the filing of the original bHl, and become 
a part thereof, and as fully as if originally conta1n-
ed therein. 
IL 
The defendant, J. C. Leonard, Jr .. Trustee, filed a motion 
to dismiss, and also a demurrer. Fred E. Smith, Manager S. K. 
M. Inc., filed a demurrer to the bill, alleging that no individual 
liability was asked against him, and this, by agreement, was sus-
tained. These matters were heard befor.e the Chancellor at 
Chambers, March 6, 1941, and at which time, the complain-
ants made an application and were given permission to amend 
the bill to more fully allege the matters in the original bill, and 
to correct the issuance and service of process, and the right was 
given the dtfendants to rely upon the motions and demurrers 
filed at a later hearing, if desired. 
III. 
And now comes the complainants, pursuant to the authority 
granted them herein, and amend their said bill, and allege that 
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the defendant, United States Fire Insurance Company of New 
York. a fo.:.eign corporation, but domesticated in Tennessee, and 
with an office and agency in Bristol, Tennessee, the S. K. & M. 
Agency, Inc., and the agency that wrote the policy herein, is 
justly indebted to them in the sum of $ 1400.00, under and by 
virtue of a certain insurance contract entered into by and between 
said defendant and the complainants herein, dated November 26, 
I 939, and being policy numbered 14909, and wherein you con-. 
tracted to pay complainants any damages or losses which they 
might sustain to the property described in the original bill here-
in by fire for a period of one year, to an amount not exceeding 
$2,000.00. The policy also contained a mortgage clause in 
favor of the defendant herein, J. C. Leonard, Jr., 
page 24 ] Trustee, as his interest may appear. 
Your complainant would further show, as alleg-
ed in the original bill, that said property which was worth more 
than the face of the policy was totally destroyed by fire on the 
22nd day of December, 1939, and thereupon, the defendant, J. 
C. Leonard, Jr., Trustee, procured from them a proof of loss 
which was furnished the said insurance company, and represent-
ed to the complainants that he was looking after their interest 
in the matter, and they were led to believe that he would col-
lect the insurance and if necessary by suit and take care of the 
note [ecured by their property. He did institute suit in the Cir-
cuit Court of Washington County, Virgini-3, for the sum of 
$ 1521. 7 4, the amount claimed to be due on the mortgage debt: 
but as before stated, did not br~ng suit for any interest of the 
complainants, and did not consult them as stated herein with 
reference to any of the matters. They would further show that 
notwithstanding the fact that the insurance company owed on 
said p~licv more than enough to pay his claim in full, he com-
promised the suit which he had instituted for $600.00, and then 
proceeded to foreclose their property. They aver that said de-~-
fendant could have foreclosed their property without resort to 
the insurance, and he could look first to the insurance and then 
foreclose had same been necessary: but they aver that he did not 
act in good faith in the matter in compromising said suit for 
$600.00, when he could have obtained enough by proper dili-
gence to have oaid the debt owing from them, and have made un-
necessary the foreclosure of their property with the extra ex-
nense due the Trustee and other expenses, and then to improper-
ly advertise their said property and force a sale for a wholly in-
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adequate price. They aver upon information and 
page 2 5 ] belief that he was very anxious for the property to 
be sold to a certain party, and had an understand-
ing from them in advance that same could be secured for $I, -
I 00.00, and knowir.g this fact agreed to take the $600.00 from 
the insurance company in order it would be necessary to sell the 
property. They will be able to show that while their said prop-
erty was being advertised, that an adjoining lot of similar size 
and value was sold for $ 1800.00, and they had made certain 
arrangements looking to a deal for the payment of their prop-
erty, and &ecured an agreement from the said J. C. Leonard, Jr., 
Trustee, for an extension of the time for the sale of the property 
to enable them to make arrangements to save their property by 
paying the debt and the Trustee or some one for him marked up 
the ten day extension on the original notice of sale, and instead 
of leaving the original notice as it was, except for the chance in 
the day of sale, changed the hour of same to an earlier hour. 
without the knowledge of complainants and sold the property 
under this i:mended notice. The complainants did not have the 
funds at that time to pay the debt, but could have done so with-
in a few days, and secured an injunction or temporary stay of 
the sale and filed the same before the time at which the sa · e 
should have been made, but for the unauthorized change; but as 
heretofore stated the sale had already been made. It is charged, 
upon information and belief that the deed for the property had 
not been made and delivered prior to the Clerk & Master noti-
fying said trustee that there was a stay order in the case. The 
complainants aver that the sale of this property was void and 
in violation of law in that a sale when advertised under the terms 
of a trust instrument for thirty days or any given time, and not 
consummated, said original advertisement be::omes null and 
void, and another advertisement must be for the same time, and 
cannot ·be made by a change on the advertisement 
page 26 ] for ten days additional. This was done for the 
the benefit of the complainant, and this question 
would not be raised, but for the change of the time, and other 
inequitabl~ conduct in the matter. The purchaser of the prop-
erty probably acted in good faith, and the sale .is not herein 
sought to be rescinded, but reserve the right to amend and seek 
such relief. but the complainant allege that the defendant, J. C. 
Leonard, Jr., Trustee, and individually is liable in damages for 
the damages which the complainant has suffered herein and by 
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reason of the matters herein alleged. Being a trustee, he did not 
act with that fairness and impartiality so "strictly required of a 
trustee. 
IV. 
As hereto fore recited herein, the defendant, United States 
Fire Insurance Company, of New York, having agreed to in-
demnify your complainants by the insurance policy or contract 
set out, the property having been totally destroyed by fire which 
was insured against, and damages having accrued in the sum of 
at least $2,000.00, and all conditions having been complied 
with required of complainants under the provisions of the pol-
icy, as to notice, proof of loss, etc., and the said defendant not 
having pa!d any part of same, except the $600.00 compromise 
r.2ttlement with the mortgagee, it is justly indebted to the com-
plainants in the sum of $ 1400.00, together with interest there-
on and the statutory penalty provided by law, and for the col-
lection of which as to it, this suit is brought. 
The complainants have in their possession, the original 
policy of insurance issued by the defendant, insurance company, 
and will exhibit the same to the defendants herein, and to the 
Court upon th~ hearing; but same cannot be filed as an exhibit, 
for the reason that same is a record in the suit filed by J. C. 
Leonard, Trustee, in the Circuit Court for Wash-
page 2 7 ] ington County, Va. 
v. 
THE PREMISES CONSIDERED, THE COMPLAINANTS 
PRAY: 
( 1) That a subpoena to answer issue both as to the orig-
inal and the amended bill as to the defendant UNITED ST AT-
ES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK. and 
be served, together with a copy of the original and the amended 
bill, and that the same be served on the S. K. M. Agency, Inc., 
the local agent of the said defendant in and for Sullivan Coun-
ty, requiring it to appear and answer the original and the amend-
ed bill, but its answer on oath is waived. 
(2) That likewise a subpoena to answer issue for the de-
fendant, J. C. Leonard, Jr., both individually and as Trustee, 
42 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
and be served on him, together with a copy of both the original 
and the amended bill, requiring him to appear and answer the 
bill, but his oath to same is waived. 
( 3) That the complainants have and recover of the de-
fendant, UNITED ST A TES FIRE INSURANCE COM-
PANY OF NEW YORK, the sum of $1400.00, interest, pen-
alty, or such sum as may due them under the policy of insurance 
sued on herein. 
( 3) That the complainants have and recover of the de-
fendant, J. C. Leonard, Jr., individually and as Trustee, all 
mch damages as they may have sustained by reason of the mat-
ters alleged in the bill and the amended bill, and that they have 
a settlement showing the disposition of the funds coming into 
his hands under the trust set out herein. 
(4) That they have all such other, further, different and 
general relief as they may be entitled. 
GEO. N. BARNES and 
TALBERT HUGHES, 
By GEO. N. BARNES, 
SAMUEL R. FLEENOR, 
MARY M. FLEENOR, 
Complainants. 
Solicitors for Complainants. 
page 28 ] EXHIBIT TO BILL 
U. S. F. I. Co. vs. Fleenor 
In the Chancery Court at Bristol, Tennessee. 
Samuel R, and Mary M. Fleenor, Complainants 
vs. PLEA IN ABATEMENT 
S. K. M. Agency, et als Defendants 
Defendant, United States Fire Insurance Company, for_ 
plea in abatement, says that at the time the policy sued on was 
written, at the time of the institution of this suit, of the service 
of process as to it and now, it was and is a corporation organiz-
ed and existing under the laws of the State of New York, with 
its principal office in the City of New Yark, in said State; that 
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it was and is now domesticated in both the States of Tennessee 
and Virginia, in accordance with the respective laws of said 
states; that the policy sued on was issued upon a dwelling there-
tofore damaged and practically destroyed by fire, located in the 
City of Bristol, Virginia; that under the then existing law of 
said State all such insurance contracts on property are deemed to 
have been made in said State; that the policy was issued on a 
form required, prescribed and approved by the laws of said 
State, and as further required by its laws, was counter-signed 
by an agent of said State (having no validity until so counter-
signed) ; that no part of the alleged cause of action arose or ac-
crued in Sullivan County, Tennessee, or in the State of Ten-
nessee; that the same did not relate to or arise out of any trans-
action had, in whole or in part, within the State of Tennessee: 
~nd that the plaintiffs were, on all of said dates and now, resi-
dents of and domiciled in the City of Bristol, in the 
page 29 ] State of Virginia. And this the defendant is ready 
to verify. 
J. W. WORLEY 
DONALD T. ST ANT 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
. Donald T. Stant, attorney for United States Fire Insur-
ance Company, makes oath that he is familiar with the allega-
tions contained in the foregoing plea, and that the said plea is 
true in substance and in fact; and further that this affidavit is 
made by him because there is no officer or agent of said defend-
ant residing in or near Bristol who is familiar with said allega-
tions. 
DONALD T. STANT 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this the 2nd day of 
April, 1941. 
J. W. WORLEY 
Notary Public, Sullivan 
County, Tennessee. 
page 30 ] NOTICE, served on both defendants, with one 
copy of bill and exhibits, May 7, 1 94 I. 
To Samuel R. Fleenor and Mary M. Fleenor: 
Take notice that on the I 2th day of May, I 941, at 10: oo 
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A. M., or as soon th!?reafter as the business of the court will per-
mit, the undersigned will move the Corporation Court of said 
City of Bristol, Virginia, or the judge thereof in vacation, to 
award a temporary injunction against each of you from and 
against the further prosecution in the Chancery Court of Bris-
tol, Tennessee, so far as concerns the undersigned, of a suit pend-
ing therein, instituted by you, as described in a copy of the orig-
inal bill, to be filed in the Corporation Court of said City, duly 
sworn to, which will be served, along with this notice, upon 
one of you, and which will be asked to be treated as an affidavit 
for the purpose of applying for such injunction. 
This the 7th day of May, 194 r. 
UNITED ST A TES FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
By DONALD T. STANT, Attorney 
DECREE, Entered May 1 2, 194 I 
Pursuant to notice duly served on defendants, complainant 
by counsel appeared and presented said notice for a temporary 
injunction, supported by allegations of its bill heretofore file.1, 
to be used as an affidavit in support of said motion. . 
The defendants, by letter from George N. Barnes, Esq .. 
of Johnson City, Tennessee, their attorney, having requested a 
postponement of said motion until May 20, 1941, and having 
agreed in said letter that no action will in the mean-
page 3 1 ] time be ·requested against complainant in the Ten-. 
nessee suit described in the bill, by agreement of par-
ties the motion for temporary injunction is postponed and con-
tinued until May 20, 1941, at ten o'clock A. M. 
FINAL DECREE, Entered May 20, 1941. 
This cause came on this day to be heard upon complain-
ant's bill duly sworn to, praying an injunction against the de-
fendants, upon process duly served upon the defendants, and 
upon notice duly served upon the defendants that on the 12th 
day of May, 1941, complainant would move the court to award 
a temporary injunction herein, the motion being heretofore con-
tinued to this date. 
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Thereupon complainant moved the court to allow it to 
amend its bill, which amendment is allowed, and is as follows: 
"14a. Complainant alleges that on October 25, 1939, the 
holder of the note in said deed of trust to J. C. Leonard, Trus-
tee, notified defendants in writing that they had promised to 
pay off the deed of trust indebtedness by the date of said notice, 
or in event of failure to do so, that the parties might go ahead 
with foreclosure, and defendants were asked to advise him defi-
nitely, within the next day or so. On November 3, 1939, de-
fendants were notified that their agreement was that the prop-
erty was to be advertised under the deed of trust, on Tuesday 
following November 3, 1939, and that the following Monday 
was therefore the last day before foreclosure. The indebted-
ness was not paid, and the trustees under said deed of trust ad-
vertised the property for sale by notice dated November 28, 
1939, the sale date being December 29, 1939; that the sale was 
continued to January 20, 1 940, by him, each continuance hav-
ing been made at request of defendants or their. 
page 3 2 ] counsel. Complainant is advised that, under the 
laws and decisions of this State, there was a violation 
of the provisions of the policy dealing with avoidance theteof 
in case of foreclosure, etc., which complainant intends to rely 
upon if allowed to do so in Virginia." 
The complainant appeared by counsel, and the defendants 
appeared in person and by counsel, and moved the court to deny 
an injunction herein, and dismiss the bill, upon the grounds 
that the allegations of the bill are insufficient, under the prin-
ciples of equity and law, to state a case jusdfying the awarding 
of an injunction, upon which motion issue was joined. 
After hearing the argument of counsel, and citation of au-
thorities, the court is of opinion that the bill is insufficient to 
state any ground for equitable relief herein, and doth deny the 
prayer for an injunction, and dismiss the bill. 
To the action of the court, the complainant by counsel ex-
cepted, and signified its intention to apply to the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia for an appeal herein. 
page 33 ] CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
I, DAN DRINKARD, Clerk of the Corporation Court for 
the City of Bristol, Virginia, do hereby certify that the forego-
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
ing is a true transcript of the record in the chancery cause of 
United States Fire Insurance Company vs. Samuel R. Fleenor 
and Mary M. Fleenor, lately pending in said court. 
I further certify that notice of the application for this trans-
cript has been duly given to counsel for defendants, as required 
by law. 
Given under my hand this the 31st day of May, 1941. 
DAN DRINKARD, Clerk. 
Clerk's fee for comparing and 
certifying transcript $5.00. 
A Copy, Teste: 
J.M. KELLY, 
Deputy Clerk. 
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